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A Reflection on Innovations in 
the Security Council:  
The International Tribunals, 
Counterterrorism, and the 
Office of the Ombudsperson 
Judge Kimberly Prost* 
Good afternoon, everyone. It’s a real pleasure for me to be here at 
Case Western. I’d like to thank Professor Cover, my old friend, and 
long time friend Assistant Dean Scharf for inviting me and for the 
tremendous hospitality. I’ve had a terrific time already here in 
Cleveland. I’m going to go back to New York to promote Cleveland 
and Case Western. 
It’s always a great opportunity for me to have these 
occasions. The job that I currently occupy as Ombudsperson is a very 
lonely job and up until about eight months ago, I was on my own. 
I’ve been doing this just a little over three years. I had no one at all 
in terms of staff. I now have a legal officer. So this is a great 
opportunity for me to talk a bit about the work and the operations of 
the office in the context of the Council and also just to talk 
today. I’m going to speak a bit more broadly about the Security 
 
* Graduating as a gold medalist from the University of Manitoba Law 
School, Judge Kimberly Prost worked for the Canadian federal 
Department of Justice for eighteen years. She served as a federal 
prosecutor, including with the Crimes against Humanity and War 
Crimes Section and appeared before all levels of the Canadian courts, 
including arguing several cases before the Supreme Court of Canada. 
For ten years, she was with the International Assistance Group, 
Canada’s central authority for international criminal cooperation 
matters, serving as Director from 1993 until 2000. She participated in 
the negotiation of over forty extradition/mutual legal assistance treaties 
and was a member of the Canadian delegation for the negotiation of the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, the related Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence and Elements of Crime, the United Nations 
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, and the United 
Nations Convention Against Corruption. In July 2000, Ms. Prost joined 
the Commonwealth Secretariat as Head of the Criminal Law Section. In 
March 2005, Ms. Prost was appointed to the post of Chief, Legal 
Advisory Section with the Division of Treaty Affairs within the United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. After election by the General 
Assembly, in July 2006, she was appointed to sit as an ad litem judge of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. In June 
of 2010, Ms. Prost was appointed by the Secretary General as 
Ombudsperson for the United Nations Security Council Al Qaida 
Sanctions Committee (1267 Committee). She is currently serving in that 
position in New York. 
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Council and some of the innovations in the Security Council, 
including my office and the work of the tribunals.   
I realized it’s a very timely opportunity to speak about the 
Security Council. For anyone who is following international news in 
the press these days, a lot has been said about the Council—a lot not 
necessarily all positive. I think in times of difficulty for the Council, it 
is important to reflect, not just on the challenges—and there are 
many for this highly political body—but also to reflect on some of the 
innovations and successes of the Security Council. That is what I 
want to try and do today because it is an important body within the 
United Nations, and I don’t think we can ever lose sight that this was 
a mechanism born of two catastrophic world wars in a time period 
when the world was very much in tatters. So I think it is important 
to bring that perspective, especially for the young people who are here 
today, because we can’t lose sight of the role that the Council plays in 
a positive sense. So I’m going to speak a little bit about the two areas 
that I think represent some of the innovations and important 
innovations of the Council, and I’ll tell you a little bit about the 
world of al-Qaida and the Ombudsperson. 
The Security Council, as you all know, is the body of the United 
Nations, which, under the Charter, has the primary responsibility for 
dealing with threats to international peace and security. It is to 
identify and respond to those threats and has a full range of powers, 
from the ability for a pacific activity for settlement through the 
imposition of economic sanctions and general sanctions, which is 
something I will speak about, to military intervention. Since almost 
its inception, the Council has used its powers, both as accorded 
explicitly and in innovative ways.   
In 1948, and it’s something that all Canadians always speak to 
about the Council, we used the concept of the military powers to send 
observer missions to the Middle East and to Pakistan, which were the 
beginnings of the peacekeeping role that the U.N. still plays to this 
day all over the world. It is important to Canadians because Lester 
Pearson, who was one of our Prime Ministers, won the Nobel Peace 
Prize partially for his role in that activity in the starting of that 
program.   
By the 1950s the Security Council had already invoked its 
military power with the intervention into the Korean crisis, which 
took place at that time. From early days it was using its sanction 
power in the context of the struggle in South Africa in reaction to the 
apartheid government of South Africa. 
So, right from the start, the body was, I think, important and did 
play an active role in international matters. But it’s really in the 
1990s when there was, for our world, an unusual rapprochement—
politically, the end of the Cold War, and massive changes with the 
end of the Soviet Union and the transformation in that context—and 
the Council grew more active and quite bold in many ways. And in 
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my view, the watershed moment for the Council came in the face of 
the brutal conflict in the former Yugoslavia: first Croatia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Kosovo, and the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia.   
There was a conflict that had the potential to destabilize the 
region and really was a significant threat to international peace and 
security. Perhaps it was because of the nature of the conflict, perhaps 
it was the history of that region and what it had represented in the 
context of the world wars, but for whatever reason the Council began 
to take some extraordinary steps. First, they sent a commission of 
experts in to look at the question, not so much of the broader 
questions of peace or resolution, but the questions of crimes—whether 
war crimes and crimes against humanity were being committed in the 
area. And in response to the report, which confirmed those activities, 
on the 25th of May, 1993, they adopted quite a historic resolution, 
Resolution 827, which overnight created the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,1 on which I served for four years 
as a judge.   
It was followed less than half a year later in 1994, in the face of 
the horrific genocide in Rwanda, by establishment of that 
tribunal. And the important thing to recognize here, and especially for 
young people whom I speak to about this, the tribunals have been in 
existence for quite awhile, so to some degree, people accept them as 
part of the landscape. But this was an extraordinary step by the 
Security Council, particularly given that nothing in the Charter—
nothing in Chapter VII—talks about establishing a court, and what 
the Council did was something that they tried to do at the time the 
Charter was written—create an international criminal body, which 
they were unsuccessful in doing. Overnight, it suddenly appeared.   
The ramifications for international humanitarian law and 
international criminal law have been mammoth. I don’t think anyone, 
not even the staunchest critics (and there are many) of the work of 
the tribunals, can detract from the fact that the tribunals have 
contributed an enormous amount of case law. These were the first 
tribunals post-Nuremberg and post-Tokyo to deal with individual 
accountability for crimes of the gravest nature, and we have that 
body of case law due to the action of the Council in creating the two 
tribunals. 
Also important contributions to peace in those regions and to 
justice, and most significantly, one of the main impetuses, we had a 
window in the world when forces came together and allowed for the 
negotiation of the Rome Statute and the International Criminal 
Court. And in no small measure we have today an International 
Criminal Court because of the steps taken to create those two 
 
1. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993).  
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tribunals and what they showed the world about the possibilities of 
individual accountability in this context. 
You will hear lots of discussion—that it’s not the best time for 
international criminal justice—today. You’ll hear lots of critiques of 
the International Criminal Court, but at the end of the day, I am a 
staunch believer who says the world is a much better place with a 
possibility of justice, with the possibilities that the International 
Criminal Court presents than without it. So that body of activity 
started by the Council’s actions, I think, is one of the last century’s, 
and into this century’s, most important steps forward in terms of 
international humanitarian and criminal law. 
It’s also interesting: people forget the implications in terms of the 
Security Council. This was a pretty dramatic step that they took. The 
Tadic Court dealt with the question of whether the Council had the 
ability or the jurisdiction to take the action that they did.2 It’s not 
surprising that the judges of the Tribunal found that they were 
properly constituted, but it’s still an important decision that reflected 
that the Council could take these kinds of innovative actions and 
successfully do so. 
It was also a change in how the Security Council was interacting 
with states. At the time I was head of Canada’s International 
Assistance Group. I woke up one morning to find that the Security 
Council had just said, in a binding way, that every country had to be 
able to cooperate with this Tribunal. This wasn’t just about setting 
up a tribunal. Countries had to be able to turn people over and had 
to be able to turn evidence over.   
Well, I’ll tell you, I had a few nightmares about that issue 
because the legislation in Canada certainly permitted me to arrange 
for extradition to another state and arrange for the sharing of 
evidence with another state, but there was no capacity to compel 
someone to go to the Tribunal or to compel evidence. I must say that 
the Canadian efforts to change legislation, which every country had to 
undertake, took much longer than I was comfortable with. They 
enacted the legislation about two months after I left. I don’t take that 
personally, but still it gives you a sense that this was the Security 
Council, in essence, starting to mold domestic law, in a way, and 
mold international cooperation, in a way.   
They did something similar only once since, in my view, and that 
was in 2001 after the tragic events of 9/11 with Resolution 13733 on 
counterterrorism, where the first paragraph of that resolution requires 
all states to have a terrorist financing offense. That was a remarkable 
 
2. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence 
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995). 
3. G.A. Res. 1373, ¶ 1 U.N. Doc. S/RES/1371 (Sept. 28, 2001).  
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action by the Security Council: again, directly implicating domestic 
law at that time in response to the threat of counter terrorism. So I 
cite those as examples of what I think are sort of positive driving 
steps by the Council changing, a bit, the way the Council interacts 
with states and certainly creating an important step forward in 
international criminal and international humanitarian law. 
At the same time, moving into the world that I now occupy, it 
was business as usual for the Council in terms of its traditional 
powers of considering international threats and imposing various 
forms of sanctions and various forms of measures, and they were 
increasingly resorting to the use of sanctions, powerful economic 
sanctions, in the face of what are, and what are today, increasingly 
complex security threats in our world. But as the use of sanctions 
grew, as with anything, the unwanted, if you will, side effects of the 
use of the Security Council’s sanction power became clearer and 
clearer and began to be the subject of criticism. When you impose, 
and we see it today with Iran, massive economic sanctions on a 
country, you certainly can have an effect in terms of trying to change 
conduct and in trying to restrict their ability (in the case of nuclear 
proliferation or whatever it might be), but at the same time, it does 
have a devastating effect on a mostly innocent population. And that 
was the problem that the Security Council had to try and address, 
and they were very cognizant of the effects—on Libya and Iraq—of 
the sanctions, which they viewed as necessary. 
So they began again in that period in the 1990s using, what I 
referred to as, smart or targeted sanctions. What those involved is, 
rather than employing the sanction against a whole country or whole 
population, they would direct the sanctions at factions, governments, 
government officials, and individuals that were responsible for 
whatever the conduct might be. They were used, for example, in the 
former Yugoslavia conflict, and they were used in the context of 
Haiti.4 It was a very important innovation for the Security Council.   
I took the job that I currently occupy, one, because of my belief 
in the need for rule of law principles at the international level and fair 
process. But I also took the job because I believe strongly that the 
international community and the Security Council should have at its 
disposal as many weapons as possible. I sat for four years on a 
genocide trial out of the Srebrenica massacres, and I am strongly of 
the view that whatever powers are possible, we need to have those in 
our arsenal to deal particularly with international humanitarian 
violations. 
 
4. See Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Barbara Oegg, Peterson Inst. for Int’l 
Economics, Targeted Sanctions: A Policy Alternative?, Symposium: 
Sanctions Reform? Evaluating the Economic Weapon in Asia and the 
World (Peterson Inst. for Int’l Economics) (Feb. 23, 2000), available at 
http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/ paper.cfm?ResearchID=371. 
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At the same time, the use of those powers has to be done in a 
credible and effective way, which is part of what motivated me to the 
job that I now occupy. The problem that arose in terms of the use of 
the sanctions (it’s a problem that probably crosses all of the 
sanctioned regimes but it was a particular issue in the context of a 
resolution) was Resolution 1267 which we now call the al-Qaida 
Sanctions Regime.5 I’ll talk a bit about the origins of it because it will 
give you a context that’s important for the fairness issues. 
So in this context of targeted sanctions: in 1999 there had been 
investigations in Kenya and Tanzania in relation to the bombings 
there of the American embassies. The investigations had determined 
that Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida were responsible for those 
particular horrific acts. As a result, the Council adopted a resolution, 
which was aimed at trying to get to bin Laden, who was in 
Afghanistan at the time.6 He was being sheltered by the Taliban, who 
had control of much of the country at that time. But instead of 
placing the sanctions on Afghanistan as a whole, they placed them 
directly onto the Taliban. They placed the three traditional forms of 
sanctions: economic sanctions, so freezing of all your assets; travel 
bans, so you can’t travel anywhere in the world; and thirdly, a 
weapons prohibition.7   
They created a committee, which would be responsible for 
designating who is a member of the Taliban.8 It wasn’t a particularly 
controversial move by the Council. It was a form of targeted sanction, 
and then there was what, at the time, seemed small and innocuous—
it doesn’t seem so today— an amendment in 2000, when they added 
Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida itself. It was now the al-Qaida and 
Taliban regime. The tricky part was that was the first time the 
Council ever employed sanctions on non-state actors because, as we 
all know, al-Qaida is not tied to any particular state. It was not like 
the Taliban, at the time tied very much to Afghanistan. You can be 
from anywhere, and you could be a member of al-Qaida. That would 
come to be a very tricky issue, as I’ll highlight shortly. 
But still in 2000, it wasn’t particularly a difficulty because there 
were a handful of people on the list, and most of them were in 
Afghanistan. But again, we have the events of 9/11, and events of 
that catastrophic nature often have an impact in terms of the 
Security Council and the activities taken at an international level. 
Hundreds of names went onto the al-Qaida/Taliban sanctions list 
 
5. S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999). 
6. Id. ¶ 2. 
7. Id. ¶ 4 (requiring economic sanctions and travel restrictions); S.C. Res. 
1333, para. 5(a), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1333 (Dec. 19, 2000) (prohibiting 
any supply of arms to the Taliban). 
8. S.C. Res. 1267, supra note 5, ¶ 6. 
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after 9/11 within weeks, particularly those believed to have been 
financing al-Qaida. So you have people all over the world suddenly on 
this list.   
What starts to happen because the Council runs this, even though 
they’re targeted sanctions, it is business as usual for the Security 
Council. So they’re not explaining themselves. They’re not sending 
notices. They’re not talking to people, which isn’t something the 
Security Council does. They talk to states. So suddenly, you did have 
situations where you could go down to your bank and try to move 
your funds and find out that all your assets were frozen. No one could 
quite tell you why. The government couldn’t tell you why. At that 
time, you can imagine there weren’t published reasons and there was 
no recourse. There was really nowhere you could turn, other than to 
your government, to ask them to speak to the Security Council, which 
is fine if you’re in Sweden. But if you’re anywhere else, it’s iffy 
whether they’re going to actually take some action and try and get 
the Council to give reasons or explanations or give you some form of 
recourse.   
So the criticisms of the use of the sanctions—and here it’s why 
that amendment was so important—because in a political context, 
when you put sanctions on states, or you put them even on a faction 
or government actors, there is a form of recourse because there is the 
political avenue. You can have debate and discussion with the 
Council; your representatives can go and speak. But if you’re an 
individual, you have no such access.   
So the criticism started almost immediately. States were in an 
uproar over how to deal with implementation, and academics began 
to take up the cause that you can’t have this complete void of 
transparency, lack of transparency, lack of fair process, and the 
Security Council did react to that. Over a period of time, they took 
some measures. Today if you Googled the 1267 al-Qaida regime, you’ll 
see a listing of all the individuals who are sanctioned and what we call 
the narrative summary of reasons for those sanctions. You will also 
find now that there are attempts made to give notice to individuals. 
There’s a review process that the committee itself carries out, and 
they created a focal point as well, someone you could write to. Bredal 
Sheet (sic), she’s a lovely person. I don’t like to refer to her as a 
mailbox, but she’s responsible simply to take communications and 
pass them to the committee.   
The tipping point for all of this, because the view was this was 
still not enough, began to be court challenges. There was a case in 
Canada involving a man named Mr. Abdelrazik who got stuck in 
Sudan.9 The Canadians wouldn’t bring him back because he was on 
 
9. Abdelrazik v. Canada (Minister of Foreign Affairs), [2010] 1 F.C.R. 267 
(Can.). 
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the list even though he was a Canadian. So he was living in the 
embassy in Sudan. He sues.   
And then there was a man named Yassin Kadi, who’s a Saudi 
millionaire, who was put on the list in 2001. He began a case in the 
European Court of Justice.10 In 2008, to everyone’s surprise I would 
say in terms of traditional international law, the European Court of 
Justice found that even though there is Article 103 of the Charter of 
the United Nations, which says that the decisions of the Security 
Council in Chapter VII trump and that the U.N. trumps, they found 
that Mr. Kadi was being subjected to these measures through a 
European Union regulation, and it didn’t matter that it came from 
the Security Council.11 There was no recourse, there was no fair 
process, and they struck it down, which meant that twenty-seven 
countries of the European Union could no longer implement the 
Security Council’s resolution.12 That got attention, to say the least.   
I’m where I am in New York because the office of Ombudsperson 
was created in December 2009, not because of the Kadi decision, or 
because of the need for fair process and the recognition of that need, 
but the court decisions were clearly a factor, a motivating factor, if 
you will.   
So what does this office do? I take applications from individuals. 
They can come directly to me. If you are on the list, you can come 
directly to me. Most of the applications I receive come in by e-
mail. Sometimes people phone me, and we help put together an e-
mail. They don’t need lawyers—about half of the applications so far 
have had lawyers—because my role is as an Ombudsperson. I take the 
case, and if I’m satisfied, all they have to do is explain to me why 
they shouldn’t be on the list; so they have to address the reasons that 
are out there for why they are on the list.   
Then I start a process whereby I gather all the information about 
the case. I send out letters to states, I look online, and I go to 
organizations sometimes. It’s interesting—I get very good cooperation. 
I mean I used to have subpoena power, and I miss my subpoena 
power, but I must say, the combination of being created by a Security 
Council resolution and being very, very annoying gets pretty good 
responses, because they know if they don’t answer me, I will phone 
them, and then I’ll come and visit. So I do get responses, but the real 
challenge, as you can imagine in information gathering, is that many 
of these listings are premised on intelligence information, and that 
means the information that they’re prepared to share—many 
 
10. Joined Cases 402/05 P & 415/05 P, Kadi & Al Barakaat Int’l Found. v. 
Council, 2008 E.C.R. I-06351, ¶ 40.  
11. Id. ¶¶ 74, 348–53.  
12. Id.  ¶¶ 348–53. 
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countries are prepared to share—is very vague. It’s certainly not 
necessarily sufficient to be maintaining a listing of this nature. 
So one of the big challenges is, it still remains a challenge, is 
trying to get access to that confidential information. I now have about 
twelve agreements, including with countries like the United Kingdom, 
France, and Germany, but there’s one big one missing. I bet you can 
guess which one it is. We’re still working on that. 
I gather as much of the information as I can. The whole 
philosophy I had from the time I took up the position was I’m going 
to take what the Security Council gave me in the resolution, and I’m 
going to use it as much as I possibly can to meet those fundamental 
principles of fairness. So know the case against you, have an 
opportunity to respond to that case and be heard by the decision 
maker, and review by an objective individual or entity.   
After I gather the information—I have four months to do that, 
and I extend the period once (but that’s it) for two months, and then 
I move to what’s called the dialogue phase. In this phase, I actually 
engage with the petitioners in the resolution, which I’ll speak about in 
a minute, which changed the process in a pretty dramatic way; the 
Security Council also encouraged me to go meet as many of the 
petitioners as I could. 
They, obviously, can’t come to me. It’s a little tricky. So I do go 
to meet with the petitioners, and it’s quite a remarkable part of the 
process. It’s during that phase that I put to the petitioner everything 
I’ve gathered unless I have confidential material. They then have an 
opportunity to tell me their response and what they want said to the 
committee. It’s interesting because several of them have said, 
including Yassin Kadi, who did bring an application before me, who I 
interviewed for a day and a half—he and others have said, “I’ve been 
on this list for ten years, and this is the first time anyone has sat 
across the table from me and asked me questions and heard my side 
of the story.” For me, that’s a really telling statement about why this 
is such a necessary measure. Putting everything else aside, that’s why 
it’s so important for fair process.  
So once I gather that information and the information from the 
petitioner, then I prepare the comprehensive report that goes to the 
Committee because it is still the Committee’s decision whether to 
delist or not. However, when I first took up the job, it was when it 
was a big risk in many ways because many thought that the 
resolution did not go nearly far enough and that this was just a fig 
leaf.  
Well, I don’t like being called a fig leaf. So when I first took up 
the job, I didn’t have the power to make a recommendation. I could 
make “observations.” But I figured, I don’t think they brought me 
here to give a fact summary. So I don’t care what we call it, but I’m 
going to call it what I think, which is what I did. That didn’t go over 
so well in some quarters but they sort of got used to it. I think the 
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attitude was, well, if she’s going to do it anyway, we might as well get 
the credit for it. So in the renewal—my original mandate was for 
eighteen months, although I got there six months in, so it was about a 
year—in June 2011, they gave me the recommendation power.   
But more importantly, by then the European Court of Justice had 
struck down the regulation. The European Council had tried to 
amend it; ECJ strikes it down again. So there’s a lot of pressure on. 
So, the resolution—and I got a call late at night telling me that this is 
what I’m going to get, which is quite a shock to me—it gave me the 
trigger power where I now make a recommendation. When I 
recommend delisting, the person or entity will come off the list in 
sixty days, unless there is a unanimous decision to the contrary, or it 
can be referred to the Security Council for a vote—but that’s a very 
significant political step to take for an individual case. 
So that was the compromise, which was achieved to try and give 
more, if you will, more independence, more emphasis to the role of 
Ombudsperson for fair process purposes. The two things, unanimous 
overturn and Security Council references have never happened. Since 
the time of that resolution, my recommendations have been effectively 
carried out by the decisions of the Security Council’s committee. It’s 
interesting because the other sort of aspects of this, I have said from 
the start, is the Council did not give me a power of judicial review. I 
think that’s politically very unlikely, if not impossible, that they’re 
going to let an outside party review the actual decisions of the 
Security Council.   
So I’m not reviewing anything to do with the original listing. I’m 
simply asking the question today, presently, looking at the 
information—and I made up a test. I admit that. There was no 
standard, so I just made it up. The standard I employ is whether 
there’s sufficient information to provide a reasonable and credible 
basis for the listing: sort of a mix of common law, civil law—it has 
words in it that everybody recognizes. It seems to work. That’s the 
test I use, and that present day assessment is now in the resolution 
because it’s of some comfort that this isn’t a review of the Council. 
It’s an independent de novo assessment of the information. 
The other important thing is that I made it very clear that I will 
do these assessments solely on the information that I gather. So it’s 
not open to a state to say to me, “We know things, and you should 
rely on us in terms of things that we say about information that we 
have.” Bottom line is: you share the information with me—you can do 
it such that I’m the only one that sees it, fair enough—but otherwise, 
I make these decisions, my recommendations, on the information 
gathered. That’s the only fair process for the petitioners. And then 
the trigger mechanism could operate. 
So that is a real impetus for the states to be able to provide me 
with confidential information, which is why discussions with the 
United States continue on that very important issue. And also, I 
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really want to know what the full facts are. This is—at the same time 
it’s important to fair process—a pretty heavy responsibility. I don’t 
want to be the one delisting somebody when there’s strong 
information that you keep them on the list. For both reasons, I’m 
hopeful that we can try and find better ways forward in terms of 
accessed information. 
I’ll give you a few statistics and then just identify a few issues 
and open it up for some discussions. I’ve had fifty cases so far of the 
approximately 375, which I think is pretty good. Thirty-two cases 
have been completed. Some of the cases involve applications by an 
individual and several entities, so the numbers don’t exactly match, 
but twenty-six individuals have been delisted. Twenty-five entities 
have been delisted. One entity was removed as an alias. It wasn’t an 
actual removal of the main name but still through my process. 
In three cases there was a denial of delisting, but in one of those, 
it was before the recommendation power, and there has been a 
subsequent application, and he was delisted. One petition was 
withdrawn, brought again, and they were delisted (the entity). Three 
cases have been concluded by separate decision of the committee. So 
my process starts, and then the committee takes the decision to delist 
of its own initiative. That included the case of Osama bin Laden, 
whose application was brought just recently, well after he was 
reportedly deceased. Fifteen cases are active at the moment. 
So I think when I look at the body of the activity, and I look at it 
stepping back again into my broader topic today, I think both the use 
of the targeted sanctions and these remarkable steps of the Security 
Council—and they are remarkable and perhaps under appreciated. 
The European Court of Justice just recently issued another decision: 
they seem unmoved by what the Council has done. I think that’s an 
under appreciation, with great respect to the Court, of the 
extraordinary steps the Security Council has taken—they make no 
mention of the work on the Ombudsperson. I think, putting aside 
whether you think ultimately it’s sufficient, that there should be 
recognition that it has brought a level of fair process. I’ve been 
satisfied in each of the cases on a practical level that the individuals 
have had a fair process in line with those principles I described. But 
the Court, at least the European Court of Justice, is not yet 
convinced and considers they have to review the underlying 
information. Although what they suggest in terms of how they will 
access confidential material, I think we’ll have to see how that works 
out in practice.     
This Special Rapporteur, Terrorism in Human Rights, wrote a 
report on the office last year.13 It was pretty positive in many 
 
13. Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, Second Rep. on the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
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respects, but because there is still the potential of the Security 
Council override, it’s not enough. I respect Ben Emmerson—he’s a 
terrific human rights lawyer. I respect his position. I don’t necessarily 
agree that that has to be tested, but I certainly understand those 
concerns.   
So there are still issues about whether this is sufficient, but I do 
think that when I look back to 2010, and I look at those fifty 
applications and those thirty-two completed cases, I think it’s 
remarkable progress in terms of the rule of law and credibility of the 
regime. 
I’m going to stop there on the role of the Ombudsperson. In 
closing, I just wanted to highlight again that it’s unquestionable that 
the Security Council, which is a highly political body operating in an 
increasingly complex world, is going to continue to face frustrations 
and challenges, and perhaps some of those challenges are 
insurmountable. It’s always going to be controversial. It’s always 
going to be criticized, but especially what shouldn’t be lost in the 
valuable debate that surrounds the Council is that we must ensure 
that it’s a balanced discussion that recognizes the strengths of this 
body as well as its weaknesses. And I started in the same position I 
am on the International Criminal Court: our world, our global village, 
is a much better place with the United Nations and the Security 
Council than it is without one. 
So to the young in the room, it’s your job to make it all better. 
I’m happy to take any questions and comments, totally open, if 
you want to ask me things about the Tribunal days as well. The only 
thing is there may be some things, which because of the position I 
occupy—I work with the Security Council’s Committee, not for 
them—there may be some things I simply don’t feel appropriate for 
me to comment on, and I’m sure you’ll all understand that. But I’m 
happy to take the questions and comments, and we’ll see where we 
get to.   
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I believe you said the financiers of al-Qaida 
are put on the list, not just al-Qaida but the financiers of al-Qaida. So 
is there at least one nation on the Security Council that is financing 
al-Qaida in the bloody civil war in Syria? And if so, should the 
persons responsible for this be put on the list? 
HON. JUDGE PROST: Well I’ll comment on the first part of your 
question. The criteria for listing that has been set by the Security 
Council is association to al-Qaida, and it is defined as any form of 
support in essence; so participating, preparing, financing—all of those 
activities are part of the definition. It’s not dissimilar from what you 
 
While Countering Terrorism, ¶¶ 12–58 U.N. Doc. A/67/396 (Sept. 26, 
2012) (by Ben Emmerson). 
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would know in United States law as the material support provisions. 
So, yes, individuals stated to have been involved in financing al-
Qaida, or entities, were placed on the list, and some of the narrative 
summaries still talk about that as being the basis for listing some 
individual and entities. 
On the broader question, this is a list that deals solely with 
individuals and entities, so I don’t deal at all with the question of 
state responsibility. That’s entirely outside my realm. 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Is a state composed of individuals; what do 
you think? 
HON. JUDGE PROST: Well it is, definitely, but as I say, there is 
this distinction. This is a part of a targeted sanction regime as 
opposed to, for example, there are sanction regimes, which are aimed 
at states but totally outside my realm of expertise and 
responsibility. So on that one, no comment. 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I have an interesting question. I saw you 
mentioned bin Laden was taken off the list. Did someone apply to 
have him taken off? I’d be curious why anyone would care if he’s off 
the list. I mean, after all, he can’t go anywhere. He’s with the fishes, 
but the money might matter. 
HON. JUDGE PROST: No, he was removed by virtue of the decision 
of the committee; it’s an issue. There has been an issue about—and 
the committee carries out a review of—individuals who are listed who 
are said to be deceased, because this is not an asset regime. It 
involves the use of a sanction measure of freezing assets. But it’s an 
individual or entity based regime. So you have to be supporting Al al-
Qaida to be on this list, and those who are deceased, obviously, no 
longer meet, in essence, the criteria.   
But there is great concern, and there certainly was in the case of 
bin Laden, which is why it took some time before he was removed by 
the Committee because of the asset issue. So they had to be satisfied. 
The Security Council added a section to the resolution, which 
specifically said states must ensure and report on or what are done 
with any assets being unfrozen as a result of his delisting. So that was 
an extra caution in his case. I think that was totally understandable, 
given he was, at one point, part of the criteria for listing.  
And why does anyone care? Because it’s part of the credibility of 
the regime, and all of the Security Council recognizes that. This is the 
sanction regime. Everyone accepts deceased persons should not be on 
the list. You deal with the assets through these kinds of measures.   
The difficulty is, of course, it’s sometimes very difficult to 
determine if someone is really deceased. And sometimes it can take a 
while because of the concerns about the assets. 
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AUDIENCE MEMBER: If someone gets delisted, do they get a 
certificate or something? 
HON. JUDGE PROST: It’s actually a really good question because 
one of the issues is that I report twice a year to the Security Council. 
I don’t report in the sense of waiting for them to say yea or nay on 
my activities, but I write reports on my activities. One of the things 
I’ve talked about is that there is a problem in terms of follow-up and 
implementation of the decision. So I’ve certainly had, and I’ve written 
about this in my reports, several petitioners who have come back to 
me and said, “I know I was delisted because you told me so; I have a 
letter, but I try to enter country X, and I’m told I can’t enter because 
of the Security Council listing; or I can’t get the bank to release my 
funds.” So I actually do, on occasion, write a letter to try to 
assist, but so far, despite my asking, and I continue to ask, the 
Security Council has not given me a direct power to intervene 
formally in those situations. So I just try to do the best I can 
informally. But they certainly get notifications, and there’s press 
release material we can send to support that. 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m surprised that there aren’t more people 
on your list because al-Qaida seems to be thriving anyway. And I 
wanted to know who advocates for you, and your position, to enable 
you to have more power? 
HON. JUDGE PROST: Very good question. It’s interesting. This is 
not an exhaustive list by any stretch. Like any other act of Council, 
the determinations to list people are based on the criteria of the 
Security Council, but there might be reasons that they don’t want to 
include certain individuals or certain entities for other 
reasons. Sometimes it might be counterproductive, it can be some of 
the splinter groups—the Council might have very good reasons. 
Perhaps they’re involved in some kind of a peace process where 
they’re trying, I think, for example, some of the groups in the 
Philippines. I’m not saying they were ever contemplated. Some of 
them were listed, some aren’t. But just as an example in which those 
kinds of scenarios can arise.   
It’s obviously quite a small list if you compare it to, for example, 
and there’s sometimes confusion on this, the United States’ famous 
“no-fly” list, which has thousands of names. But it’s a very, very 
different kind of list, and it’s also—and this is one of the issues I 
have—the criteria for listing by the Security Council, the one which I 
must examine solely, is association to al-Qaida. It’s not terrorism, and 
that’s a big, big difference because many of the domestic lists are 
about those who support terrorism writ large, which is a huge, 
different question. 
So sometimes I might have cases where they might be involved in 
criminal activity, or they might be involved even in terrorist activity, 
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but the issue I have to address, and that’s what the rule of law of 
course is all about, is are they associated to al-Qaida. 
Who advocates for me? There is, obviously, a great body of 
NGOs, academics who are very interested in the question of fair 
process and the sanction regimes. There is what’s called the like-
minded group of states, who have been extraordinarily influential in 
this area. The usual suspects, I like to say, are the Scandinavian 
countries. They’re actually formally known; it’s not secret in any 
way—Germany, Costa Rica; I hope I don’t forget anyone. But they 
do a tremendous amount of advocacy work. They do, obviously, 
political diplomacy work. They were instrumental, those groups of 
countries, in the creation of the Office of the Ombudsperson. The 
name came from the Scandinavians because originally Ombudsperson, 
or it is “ombudsman” originally, is a Danish concept.   
So, there are many advocates. I certainly advocate for myself. I 
have to be very careful. It’s not for me to advocate on things like: 
Should this regime be extended to other sanction regimes? That’s a 
matter for states. There are certain broad questions, but on things 
like where do I see weaknesses in the process, or where do I see 
unfairness in the process—those points, the follow-up point, for 
example, I write and speak about to the Council, and I feel that’s 
within my purview. For example, one of the things when I first took 
up the job was the designating state. That’s the state—that’s the 
term we use—that’s the state or states that put the person or put 
them forward for listing. It’s still a committee decision, but it’s 
obviously the state that has the critical information. And from my 
point of view, a petitioner must know for fair process who the 
designating state was. Because you can imagine, if your relationship 
with the state is not so good, that might be a factor you want to raise 
in your submissions. But that information was not available. It’s still 
not available, but I wrote about it repeatedly. The Special Rapporteur 
spoke about it, and in the last resolution, they have reversed the 
onus. So now, unless a state specifically objects to having their name 
released, and very few have, I’m able to release that information. 
That’s just an example. And again, by being annoying and 
writing about it over and over again, you speak about it, they get 
tired, and eventually you make some progress. There is a fair bit of 
advocacy, which I think is a really good thing. 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m just curious. The people who have been 
delisted: I recognize that no two cases are alike. I’m just curious if 
you’ve noticed any trends or recurring issues that have come up in 
any or all or a handful of those cases. 
HON. JUDGE PROST: It’s interesting, and it’s always a bit difficult 
because to date—and this is something that certainly I write about 
and others write about—my reports are strictly confidential to the 
Committee. I can’t even reveal to the petitioner or to the public what 
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my recommendations are, though it’s not hard to figure out because 
I’m able to say there’s not been an overturn or a Security Council 
reference, so people can figure it out. As a result, I’m guarded in what 
I can say.   
But interestingly it has not been things that when I first took the 
job I thought it might be. For example, people arguing mistaken 
identity. There have been more factors because I operate to this lower 
standard, and it’s not a criminal standard. The Council’s made it very 
clear. This is not punitive; it’s preventative. Because you’re operating 
to a lower standard, you can base these listings on reasonable 
information or inferences that you’re drawing from information.   
I’ve had several cases where what became an issue was whether 
those inferences were correct. Because I take the approach of saying, 
“I’m looking at all the information now that is critically important, 
and that includes things the petitioner brings forward.” So I have had 
several cases where the petitioner says, “Okay, I can see why that 
would look pretty suspicious, and it might even reach the threshold, 
but here’s what the story was,” and sometimes they can produce 
documentation. There’s been more of that than I expected, but I 
think it’s an interesting point. I think it’s okay in a preventative 
measure, and a measure that’s meant to change conduct, to rely on a 
lower standard, and those inferences that you draw like you do with a 
search warrant application, in my old prosecutor days. 
But it’s important then that you allow a response to that, and 
you take that information into account. Each case really is different 
and very, very interesting, and sometimes it’s changed 
circumstances. People have changed, and the situation they were tied 
to has changed. So there are a lot of interesting scenarios. 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I wonder, given what seems the high rate at 
which cases have been delisted and people have been delisted, 
wouldn’t it make more sense for the Ombudsperson to adjudicate, 
or not adjudicate, but to examine these cases at the front-end before 
the actual listing has gone through, so there is not this stigmatizing 
effect to those who really shouldn’t have been delisted? 
HON. JUDGE PROST: There are two points on that question. One 
is, and the front-end issue has been, a point that’s been argued, and 
it’s still discussed.   
First, I gave you the numbers, and yes, it’s pretty high, but there 
are some factors that go into that. At the beginning—I spoke about 
this earlier—there was what the Danish ambassador called the low-
hanging fruit. There were cases that were really sitting there. I had a 
case sitting on my desk before I even arrived. There were cases that, I 
think, for a combination of reasons, were older, relatively 
straightforward, and now we’re starting to see much more complex 
cases. I don’t think the numbers for over the first three years are 
trends that will necessarily be the same. The problem with having a 
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front-end review is it raises this whole political issue, which is: this is 
the Security Council, which the Charter gives the power to make 
these decisions under Chapter VII, and there is simply, it is very 
difficult if not impossible, to have an independent party reviewing. 
This is the problem with giving full judicial review: reviewing the 
decisions of the Security Council, which is what a front-end 
consideration is. Although there’s probably ways you can structure it. 
It’s much more difficult, politically, to have that.   
And yes, there is the point that it would avoid listings and 
stigmatization, which is always a very important point. At the same 
time, I’m less concerned about that now because the day after you’re 
listed, you can apply to be delisted. You’ll still have to go through the 
process, but it’s much more effective now, and there’s much less of a 
concern now that there is the mechanism. And also, the mechanism 
has had a real effect on the listings process because what happens is 
that the country proposing someone for listing has to provide a 
statement of reasons, and they keep making the point that these 
reasons must be very detailed, and it has to be a unanimous decision 
to put someone on the list.   
So the fact that they know they have that Canadian woman at 
the end of the process, I think, has been a bit of a “well, we’d better 
think whether we agree with her or not, and we better think how 
she’ll look at this case if it comes to her.” So I think there’s a lot 
more strengthening of the process through that end. Not to say that 
there’s still discussion about it, but I think that’s the context in 
which it’s been dealt with. 
